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2 Structured abstract 
Objective 
1. To build and curate a linkable multi-centre database of high resolution longitudinal 
electronic health records (EHR) from adult Intensive Care Units (ICU) 
2. To develop a set of open-source tools to make these data ‘research ready’ while 
protecting patient’s privacy with a particular focus on anonymisation 
  Materials and Methods 
  We developed a scalable EHR processing pipeline for extracting, linking, normalising 
and curating and anonymising EHR data. Patient and public involvement was sought 
from the outset, and approval to hold these data was granted by the NHS Health 
Research Authority’s Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG). The data are held in a 
certified Data Safe Haven. We followed sustainable software development principles 
throughout, and defined and populated a common data model that links to other 
clinical areas. 
  Results 
  Longitudinal EHR data were loaded into the CCHIC database from eleven adult ICUs 
at 5 UK teaching hospitals. From January 2014 to January 2017, this amounted to 
21,930 and admissions (18,074 unique patients). Typical admissions have 70 data-items 
pertaining to admission and discharge, and a median of 1030 (IQR 481 to 2335) time-
varying measures. Training datasets were made available through virtual machine 
images emulating the data processing environment. An open source R package, 
cleanEHR, was developed and released that transforms the data into a square table 
readily analysable by most statistical packages. A simple language agnostic 
configuration file will allow the user to select and clean variables, and impute missing 
data. An audit trail makes clear the provenance of the data at all times. 
  Discussion 
  Making health care data available for research is problematic. CCHIC is a unique 
multi-centre longitudinal and linkable resource that prioritises patient privacy through 
the highest standards of data security, but also provides tools to clean, organise, and 
anonymise the data. We believe the development of such tools are essential if we are to 
meet the twin requirements of respecting patient privacy and working for patient 
benefit. 
Conclusion 
  The CCHIC database is now in use by health care researchers from academia and 
industry. The 'research ready' suite of data preparation tools have facilitated access, 
and linkage to national databases of secondary care is underway. 
  Keywords 
  electronic health records; database; clinical decision support; critical care; 
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3 Introduction 
Empirical observation, or measurement, was the foundation of the Scientific Revolution, but 
was historically expensive. [1] Digitalisation and the computer age have changed this, and 
the electronic health record (EHR) is health care’s version of ‘big data’. Critical care will 
inevitably be at the forefront of the big data revolution because there is no other 
environment where patients are monitored more closely, or with such a broad range of 
measures. 
However, making such data available for research is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, 
health data is sensitive, and the protection of patient privacy must trump all other issues. 
Secondly, such data is frequently unusable in its raw format. The pace of research must not 
be mired by the need to repeatedly prepare and clean the data. Thirdly, the data should not 
exist in isolation. A critical care admission is just one part of an illness pathway. There are 
antecedents and consequences, and those consequences will impact the patient, their family, 
and the health service. 
Underlying these issues, there is also the thornier problem of data ownership. If the default 
position is that organisations are temporary guardians of personal data, then there is an 
expectation that the data should be used in the best interests of patients. 
In response to this we have developed the Critical Care Health Informatics Collaborative 
(CCHIC), a partnership between the UK’s National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) and 
five leading NHS hospital trusts. CCHIC attempts to deliver critical care ‘big data’ to 
researchers thereby facilitating research for patient benefit. Demographics, diagnostic, 
physiological and treatment data are abstracted from critical care admission to discharge 
creating a high-resolution, longitudinal EHR of unprecedented depth and breadth. 
Uniquely, the resource is designed to be explicitly linkable. This means that other clinical 
specialties can understand the disease process in their most vulnerable and unwell patients. 
It means that we can begin to share with patients and families a true picture of survivorship 
following critical care. We can report on long term outcomes, subsequent disease profiles, 
and use of health resources. We can in theory understand whether people return to work, 
and the impact of the illness on the wider family. 
CCHIC has a specific focus on open-access, reproducible research that is done with patient 
and public involvement from the outset. Making the data research ready yet robustly 
anonymised for as wide a community of academic and clinical collaborators as possible fulfils 
our ethical responsibility to the patients who provide these data. In this paper we describe 
the database, the pipeline (extracting, cleaning, curating, and distributing), and the tools 
built to enable reproducible research. 
3.1 Objectives 
The objectives of our research were threefold: 
1. To build and curate a linkable multi-centre database of high-resolution, longitudinal 
and multi-modal EHR data from adult Intensive Care units (ICU) 
2. To create a scalable pipeline (‘Extract Transform Load’, ETL) for extracting, linking, 
cleaning, encoding and anonymising ICU data across multiple secondary healthcare 
providers 
3. To develop a set of open source tools and methods for undertaking reproducible 
research using the database AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 Page 5 of 24                                                                              Version 2018-01-10t13:23:28 
4 Materials and Methods 
In 2014, CCHIC started to recruit consecutive admissions to the general adult medical and 
surgical critical care units at the five founding National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) 
BRCs at Cambridge, Guy’s, Kings’ and St Thomas’, Imperial, Oxford and University 
College London (UCL). The current dataset (version 1.0) includes 264 fields comprising 108 
hospital, unit, patient and episode descriptors (recorded once per admission), and 154 time-
varying physiology and therapeutic fields (recorded hourly, daily etc.).* Data are currently 
exported on a quarterly basis with the ambition to move to near realtime collection. 
 
Biomedical Research Centre Hospital Unit 
Cambridge Addenbrooke’s Hospital ICU/HDU 
Cambridge Addenbrooke’s Hospital Neuro 
GSTT Guy’s Hospital ICU 
GSTT St Thomas’ Hospital ICU/HDU 
GSTT St Thomas’ Hospital OIR 
GSTT St Thomas’ Hosptial HDU 
Imperial Hammersmith Hospital ICU/HDU 
Imperial St Mary’s Hospital London ICU 
Oxford John Radcliffe ICU 
UCLH University College Hospital ICU/HDU 
UCLH Westmoreland Street ICU/HDU 
Table 1: Participating hospitals and critical care units (ICU: Intensive Care Unit, HDU: High Dependency Unit, 
OIR: Overnight Intensive Recovery) 
4.1 Regulatory Approval 
To be of benefit to researchers the database must allow access to data that is reflective of the 
entire critical care cohort for their full critical illness. A direct consent model would face two 
challenges. The practicability of consenting thousands of patients per year, and, more 
importantly, the lack of capacity to consent for many critically ill patients. This is either due 
to the severity of the illness, the use of sedation during mechanical ventilation, or a high 
(circa 15%) early mortality rate. A consent based model would under-represent the most 
unwell patients. 
The project therefore approached the NHS Health Research Authority’s Confidentiality 
Advisory Group (CAG) who provided a legal basis for data sharing for essential medical 
research, and granted an exemption to the common law duty of confidentiality for the 
project under Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 (14/CAG/1001). A favourable opinion was 
provided by the National Research Ethics Service (14/LO/103). Data sharing agreements 
were signed between the participating NHS Trusts and UCL which hosts the Data Safe 
Haven (DSH) where the data are stored. The DSH is certified to the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
information security standard and conforms to the NHS Digital’s Information Governance 
Toolkit. [2] 
All patients are provided with information regarding the project and an option by which to 
opt out. Public and patient involvement is actively sought through notifications at each 
participating unit, and other media.† 
                                                     
* The data set is available via the http://www.hdf.nihr.ac.uk/catalogue/#/catalogue/dataModel/13 
† Videos explaining the programme are available on the internet 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjE9VQo-nP4&t=11s, and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQJmV6i58H4) 
CC
EP
TE
D M
AN
SC
RI
PT
 Page 6 of 24                                                                              Version 2018-01-10t13:23:28 
4.2 CCHIC design principles 
The design of CCHIC has been based on the following principles: 
1. to protect the privacy of the patients 
2. to support research for patient benefit (specifically excluding commercial exploitation) 
3. to facilitate that research by building a scalable pipeline for extracting, processing, and 
sharing the data 
4.2.1 Principle 1: patient privacy 
Being able to protect patient’s privacy with confidence is the first and foremost 
consideration for this data resource. Extensive patient and public engagement work has 
been performed to ensure that this resource is seen as a public good by a broad cross-section 
of constituents. The particular problem with critical care research is that the patients 
themselves are either temporarily or permanently incapacitated and therefore unable to offer 
explicit permission. In the UK, this triggers the need for an application to the Secretary of 
State for Health to hold these data without consent (as per Section 251 of the NHS Act 
2006). Permission is only granted when the physical security of the data can be guaranteed, 
and when the justification for holding the data is in the public interest (hence principle 2). 
The data itself is encrypted before leaving each hospital, and then moved to the data safe 
haven at University College London. Access to the identifiable data is strictly controlled, 
but an anonymisation step in the data pipeline makes an extract of the data ready for the 
end-researcher (principle 3). 
4.2.2 Principle 2: research for patient benefit 
Even after privacy is protected, there is a widely reported distinction in the public 
perception of rights to use data. Recent furore over the partnership between the Royal Free 
NHS Foundation Trust and Google DeepMind in 2016 was driven by suspicion of the 
motives of commercial organisations especially those with the pervasive reach of Google.[3] 
In the DeepMind case, the purported use of the data was to simply develop an alerting 
system for patients with acute kidney injury. However calculating the AKI class from a 
laboratory creatinine is so simple that it is hard to believe this was Google’s end game. In 
fact the Information Sharing Agreement that was signed in 2015 placed no restrictions on 
the data to be analysed, or the technologies that might be used. [4] 
For CCHIC, in contrast, the data cannot be used for profit, the research question must be 
explicitly for patient benefit, and even anonymised data releases must be proportional to the 
researcher’s need. 
4.2.3 Principle 3: research ready 
Principle (1) protects the patient, and Principle (2) justifies the risks, however small, of making health care data 
available. Principle (3) enables the researcher to deliver on the promise of their research. Most data analysis 
requires a huge amount of preparation. We therefore developed an automated data processing pipeline to 
process, curate, and make available the data. 
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Figure 1: Data processing pipeline: Data moves from the hospital EHR to the UCL data safe haven as an XML 
file, and is validated before appending to the central database. A data quality report is then returned to the 
submitting site. Preliminary cleaning removes out of range and invalid entries. The database can then be queried 
in its identifiable form by authorised users within the safe haven, or a separate anonymiser can produce extracts 
for external collaborators. 
4.2.3.1 Data specification 
We developed an XML-based format for individual ICUs to store and transmit the 
extracted EHR data. The common data model was developed in collaboration with 
clinicians, clinical information systems architects and researchers. A description of the XML 
data model used is provided via the NIHR’s Health Data Finder.[5]* 
We extract EHR data from each ICU using a combination of manual, semi-automatic or 
entirely automatic methods adapted to local ICU clinical information systems. Currently, 
this includes systems from Phillips Healthcare and Epic Systems, but there is no barrier to 
extraction from other EHR providers. Data items are extracted as frequently as they were 
reported (typically hourly) from ICU admission to discharge.† This includes bedside 
physiology, near patient testing, laboratory testing, and drug administration. In addition, 
diagnostic coding, patient co-morbidities, admission and discharge pathways, demographics 
and other information typically used for risk adjustment are extracted on a per admission 
basis. 
Uniquely, patient identifiers (NHS number, name, and date of birth) are retained with the 
record to enable linkage to other health and social care resources. This includes but is not 
limited to data curated by NHS digital (e.g. Hospital Episode Statistics, and mortality data 
from the Office of National Statistics), primary care, and clinical trial data sets. 
4.2.4 Data quality 
Our approach to data quality is based on the philosophy of reproducing accurately the local 
EHR rather than curating data for audit, benchmarking or quality control. For example, 
aberrant invasive blood pressure readings of 300mmHg occur when the transducer system is 
flushed, and exposed to the attached pressure bag instead of the patient. For benchmarking, 
it is important to identify and exclude these values before using them to adjust for patient 
outcomes. However, it is exactly this sort of artefact that must be handled by the designer of 
                                                     
* Of note, this XML schema is common to other clinical schemes under the umbrella Health Informatics 
Collaborative programme including acute coronary syndromes, ovarian cancer, renal transplant anf viral 
hepatitis. 
† Some data items such as waveform data are often recorded at microsecond intervals, but are only reported to 
the local EHR solution at hourly or similar intervals. 
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a clinical monitoring system. Such use cases are very much part of the justification for 
CCHIC. Similarly, some projects will automatically impute missing data or discard 
incomplete records whereas others use the pattern of missingness for clinical diagnostics. 
[6] 
Hence data extracts were accepted if the provenance (submitting unit, file name and 
timestamp) and the indexing information (critical care unit, episode identifier, data item 
label and timestamp) were complete. A data quality report summarised the completeness of 
each time-invariant field, and the sampling frequency of the time-varying fields. 
Field level characteristics of new data ingests were compared to existing data within and 
across institutions in order to identify failure of local extraction procedures to accurately 
capture the local EHR. Fresh extracts were requested where reporting did not meet the 
schema standards (e.g. reporting PaO2 in mmHg rather than kPa), or where entire fields 
were missing because of a problem with local exporting. 
4.2.5 Data anonymisation 
Researchers may apply to work with the primary identifiable data where necessary. 
However, limiting this access is clearly desirable with respect to data security. Moreover, 
working directly within the data safe haven (DSH) means the data storage environment also 
becomes the development environment. The pace of change of modern machine learning, 
statistical, and software tools would mean that the development environment needs 
continuous updating. This is a burden, and a security risk. Each update requires an external 
ingest of code, and as the number of researchers grows then so will the number of tools, and 
the risk of external exposure. 
We therefore minimise this risk by undertaking to make available anonymised data extracts 
to approved researchers. Here we follow guidance from the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) [7] which is in turn based on the UK Data Protection Act (DPA) 1988 and 
Recital 26 of the European Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)* The key principle is that 
“information or a combination of information, that does not relate to and identify an 
individual, is not personal data”. [7] Moreover, 
(there is) clear legal authority for the view that where an organisation converts personal 
data into an anonymised form and discloses it, this will not amount to a disclosure of 
personal data. 
The anonymisation focussed on three areas: 
1. Minimising the likelihood of re-identification 
2. Minimising incentives for re-identification 
3. Maximising the quality of data post-anonymisation 
4.2.5.1 Minimising the likelihood of re-identification 
We first delete all direct identifiers (e.g. NHS numbers which have a uniquely identify an 
individual). However, other key variables can be combined by a motivated intruder, 
particularly one with access to external data sources, to re-identify individuals by the 
intersection of specific rare values. 
K-anonymity counts the number of individuals identified at this intersection, and we set k so 
that this smallest group still provides anonymity for its members.† In practice, we use a 
heuristic algorithm within the sdcMicro R package [8] developed by the International 
Household Survey Network to suppress quasi-identifiers from the dataset until the target k-
                                                     
* On 25 May 2018, this will be superseded by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679). 
† For example, if we release individual data describing ‘species’, and ‘favourite sandwich filling’, then the 
intersection of ‘bears’ and ‘marmalade’ would uniquely identify Paddington Bear. If we generalise ‘favourite 
sandwich filling’ to ‘prefers sweet sandwiches’ then because Pooh Bear likes honey as well as Paddington liking 
marmalade, the k-anonymity would rise to two. 
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anonymity is reached.[9] Quasi-identifiers are aggregated to increase the granularity before 
the k-anonymity suppression.* Additionally, for the public release, the remaining quasi-
identifiers are perturbed with noise. 
4.2.5.2 Minimising incentives for re-identification 
While a cliche, there is anonymity in obscurity. For this reason, records of publicly 
prominent individuals† are removed prior to a data release (just as invidual opt-outs are 
removed prior to data storage). However, because of the sensitivity of medical data, this risk 
remains to others. In addition, we prospectively identify sensitive data items such as those 
recording (alcoholic) cirrhosis, or HIV status. These are either suppressed if homogeneous, 
or released if heterogenous. In this way the disease status of the members of even the 
smallest (k) group remains uncertain.‡ 
4.2.5.3 Maximising the quality of data post-anonymisation 
There is a trade off between information loss and disclosure risk so that as the risk of 
disclosure decreases then so does utility of the data. To define this we need to measure the 
information content, and quantify the disclosure risk. 
For non-identifying variables, (e.g. heart rate), there is no information loss. For key 
variables and sensitive fields, a balance must be reached. For example, a project examining 
the weekend effect on critical care outcomes might have to sacrifice granularity in other key 
variables (e.g. age) in order to extract the data. Such a compromise is not normally an 
impediment. Where information loss is not acceptable, then the research team will have to 
go through a vetting process to work with the original data, and be prepared to work with 
                                                     
* For example, if the two most elderly patients were 101 and 109 years old, there is a risk of re-identification. 
These extreme values might be replaced (perhaps with the local median of 105 years). K-anonymity could then 
be (re)evaluated, and is likely to increase. 
† The team managing the MIMIC-III database at MIT report that there were several attempts at identifying 
the victims of the Boston marathon bombing in 2013. Although their database is open source, they have removed 
this individuals from the publicly released version. 
‡ This is known as l-diversity and guarantees that even if an individual can be identified as belonging to a small 
group (cell) there is sufficient variability of these sensitive items within that group that uncertainty remains as to 
an specific individual’s status. 
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the more limited set of tools available in the Data Safe Haven. 
Figure 2: Data anonymisation: algorithm implementation: A summary of the anonymisation process applied 
before any data release. 
1. Removal of direct identifiers: All unique identifiers including NHS number and hospital number will be 
removed from the data before release. 
2. Remove high risk individuals and specific opt-outs 
3. Date and time metadata: All timestamps are converted to data and time differences from the instant of critical 
care admission.  
4. Aggregate continuous and date-time key variables: Because we cannot group patients by a continuous 
measure, the concept of k-anonymity only applies to categorical variables (e.g. we can group patients by eye 
colour, but not hair length). Where a key variable is continuous then we will run an initial conversion to a 
categorical version by aggregating. The unit of aggregation will be the natural unit of the measurement (e.g. 
years for age, or kilograms for weight), and the initial aggregation will be some multiple of that unit (e.g. 2 years, 
and 5 kg respectively). These multiples will be initially small in order to minimise information loss, but will be 
increased during the iterative specific anonymisation step until the necessary k-anonymity and l-diversity is 
reached. 
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5. Remove living subjects (where possible): The Data Protection Act only applies to living individuals so where 
possible data will only be released for non-survivors. 
4.2.5.4 Data anonymisation: tiered data access model 
The algorithm above provides a mechanistic level of security that is supplemented by 
additional administrative safe guards. For example, in contrast to a member of the general 
public, a medically qualified researcher is expected to follow a code of professional ethics 
with associated sanctions for breach of this code. Releases to the general public are more 
strictly anonymised than releases to medical researchers. 
We have two standard tiers of data release based on the likelihood of re-identification being 
attempted: general public, or quasi-public. The general public extract is a small subset of the 
original dataset, where direct identifiers are removed, and quasi-identifiable variables are 
heavily aggregated and perturbed. It thus has the lowest disclosure risk but also the lowest 
data usability. Although the physiology fields are unaltered, the analysis results cannot be 
directly used for publication. The purpose of this dataset is for users to familiarise 
themselves with the data structure and to develop hypotheses that could be tested on the full 
data. To gain access to this dataset, researchers must sign data sharing agreement, 
identifying themselves and their institution, confirming that they will be only be using the 
data for clinical research (in line with our research ethics permissions), and undertaking to 
be respectful of the data (specifically not to pass it on, nor to attempt to re-identify 
individuals). 
A quasi-public data extract is distributed to researchers who have submitted a data request 
that has been vetted by the CCHIC governance structure. Researchers are recommended to 
request the minimum set of fields necessary for their planned analysis. The data may be 
suitable for a complete analysis but this will depend on the balance between the fields 
requested, and resolution required. Where this balance cannot be achieved with a public 
release, then the analysis may initially proceed using the anonymised data. The analysis 
script is then tested on a virtual machine that simulates the development inside the data safe 
haven. Finally, the tested script is deployed within the safe haven, and the outputs are 
released to the investigator after inspection to ensure that these too pose no re-identification 
risk. 
4.2.5.5 Research ready: the cleanEHR toolkit 
As described above, the data that is released is a ‘warts and all’ version of the electronic 
health care record integrated across the sites. Although being faithful to the original record 
is a design principle, it leaves most researchers with the huge task of cleaning the data. We 
therefore provide alongside the data a set of tools covering the most common data pre-
processing and post-processing operations. These are provided as an open source package 
cleanEHR for the R statistical programming language. 
The most important of these is a function that converts the various asynchronous lists of 
time-dependent measurements into a table of measurements with a customisable cadence. 
For example, if the researcher wishes to the data every hour then a skeleton table is built 
with one row per critical care admission per hour from the time of admission to the time of 
discharge. For time-invariant data, the data items are repeated across all rows. For time-
varying items, a value is inserted if a value has been recorded in that hour.* The end result 
is a data frame that is ready for analysis in applications from Microsoft Excel to SPSS, from 
R to Python. 
A second function is used to stitch together separate but sequential critical care admissions 
into a unified illness spell. Regardless of whether care for that spell of illness is provided in a 
single facility, or across multiple facilities, the longitudinal data is appropriately 
concatenated. This is a particular problem in the UK where similar patients may step down 
from an ICU to an High Dependency Unit (HDU) in one institution, but may have all their 
care delivered in a single critical care unit in another institution. 
Additional functionality includes the ability to relabel the data fields at will, to perform 
                                                     
* Where more than one item is available in that time period, the most recent measurement is used by default 
although other selection algorithms are possible. 
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range and consistency checks, and to either impute missing values or to remove episodes 
with excess missingness. All of this is performed by providing a simple text file with the 
configuration requests so that even users not familiar with the R programming language 
can configure the data processing and cleaning pipeline to match their requirements.* The 
entire package is provided with tutorials and documentation. The cleanEHR toolkit is freely 
available from the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) and GitHub. 
                                                     
* The text file is specified using the human readable and writeable version of XML called YAML. Learning the 
formatting rules for this should take no more than ten minutes. [10] 
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5 Current data 
The initial data set specification (version 1.0) was released to contributing sites in 2013. 
Data collection started in 3 ICUs from 3 hospitals in February 2014, and expanded to 11 
ICUs from 5 hospitals by July 2017 with regular quarterly updates by which time, the 
database contained 21930 critical care admissions. 
The data set contains 258 variables describing each admission plus additional unit and 
hospital level metadata. 165 variables are time-dependent (e.g. drugs, physiology etc.), and 
the remaining 93 are captured on admission or discharge to the ICU, or discharge from the 
hospital. We used the ICNARC coding method to capture admission diagnosis as per the 
UK’s national audit.[11] The data specification permits multiple levels of metadata to be 
associated with each measurement (i.e. site and units of measurement, route and method of 
drug administration etc.). We hope to expand the data set to include additional structured 
data items, narrative text, and waveform data in the near future. 
A typical admission would have 70 time-invariant measures, and a median of 1030 (IQR 481 
to 2335) time-varying measures. The database therefore contained more than 60 million 
data items plus associated meta data. 
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Figure 3: Number of physiology observations in the database by day relative to admission 
A user may therefore recreate, in detail, the longitudinal profile of an individual patient, or 
examine the distribution of variables across all patients. 
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Figure 4: Selected physiology measures and drug administration from an admission with Inhalation pneumonitis 
CCHIC population across each individual ICU unit and in total with descriptive statistics 
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  Demographics Drugs Laboratory Other Physiology All 
On admission        
 Dates 1     1 
 Admission descriptors 6     6 
 Patient characteristics 12     12 
 Pre-admission descriptors 10     10 
 Prognostic scoring 
information 
24     24 
On discharge        
 Dates 2     2 
 End of life 12     12 
 Episode descriptors 6     6 
 Organ dysfunction 
summary 
1     1 
 Post-admission 
descriptors 
1     1 
 Prognostic scoring 
information 
4     4 
Late follow-up        
 Dates 3     3 
 Episode descriptors 2     2 
 Post-admission 
descriptors 
9     9 
Daily        
 Organ dysfunction 9    9     
 Fluid balance     1 1 
Within 30 minutes of 
input 
       
 Anti-microbials  45    45 
 Cardiovascular     14 14 
 Chemistry   15   15 
 CNS  9    9 
 CVSvasoactive  15    15 
 Dates 2     2 
 Haematology   5   5 
 Microbiology   3   3 
 Neurology     6 6 
 Position    1  1 
 Renal     8 8 
 Respiratory   4  17 21 
 Temperature    2  2 
  104 69 26 3 55 258 
Table 2: Count of data fields (variables) classified by type and time dependence 
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6 Discussion 
The widespread adoption of EHR platforms coupled with technical advancements in clinical 
information systems and biomedical information standards has enabled the collection and 
re-use of clinical data for research. Historically however, researchers typically only get to 
see the tip of the iceberg: coded administrative data relating to healthcare claims with 
mainly record billable diagnoses and procedures. The rich data generated across the clinical 
pathway remain submerged and inaccessible. It is to this challenge that CCHIC is 
responding. 
6.1 Comparison with other databases 
6.1.1 MIMIC 
Notable resources already exist in the United States, such as the Medical Information Mart 
for Intensive Care III (MIMIC-III) database, but these are single centre initiatives.[12] 
MIMIC has nonetheless set the precedent for open access health data, and has been 
enormously successful in this regard. The full MIMIC database is available to researchers 
who complete a human research ethics training programme, and sign a data use agreement. 
In contrast, CCHIC makes available a restricted fully anonymised exemplar data set for 
exploration, and code development. Access to the full data set currently requires approval by 
the CCHIC data advisory group. Because the source data is fully identifiable, and until we 
have tested our anonymisation process more widely, we feel this is an appropriate balance. 
The only external data that is routinely linked to MIMIC is mortality via social security 
records. CCHIC, in contrast, was designed from the outset to link regularly to a wide range 
of health and social care databases. The aim is to eventually collate a cradle to grave 
perspective of health for patients who experience critical illness. Permissions are already in 
place to link to hospital episode data thereby defining secondary care use following 
discharge, and comorbidities prior to admission. Permissions will next be sought for long 
term survival, and primary care episodes. 
6.1.2 ICNARC 
The other major UK critical care database belongs to the Intensive Care National Audit and 
Research Centre’s Case Mix Programme (ICNARC CMP). This is now, with the exception 
of Scotland, a national audit programme with more than twenty years of data. However, the 
CMP is designed for benchmarking not research.[13] As such it only contains selected data 
during the first 24 hours of admissions to critical care with summarised outcome measures. 
Linkage is possible but not explicitly part of the remit of the design. 
We see ICNARC and CCHIC as two synergistic programmes: one with a wide-angled 
historical view, and one with a detailed, longitudinal view enriched with secondary sources. 
6.2 Limitations 
The future of CCHIC depends on our meeting the obligations to patient privacy, and 
research for patient benefit. The initial technical hurdle has been in transforming the 
database into a research ready resource. In this we believe we have made significant 
progress. 
The next major technical challenge is to extend the data set, and expand the group of 
participating hospitals beyond the founding academic centres. Currently, both of these 
endeavours would require individual sites to write further local ETL (extract, transform, 
load) schemes. This is a significant burden that is multiplied by each data request and each 
participating site. Our experience is that even where sites share similar EHR systems, each 
has been so extensively modified that the ETL scripts are not transferrable. 
One solution is to shift the burden of data transformation centrally. [14] Each site is then 
only required to write a smaller data extraction routine. This routine identifies data items 
associated with critical care admissions (e.g. by filtering HL7 messages), and then transfers 
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them centrally. Since all messages are archived, the data set can be expanded variable by 
variable as transformation and loading routines are developed. Moreover, these could be 
applied retrospectively to the existing data archive. The barrier to new sites joining would 
also be much lower. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Making health care data available to researchers is a huge challenge. The data is both 
sensitive, and the research needs are many. Resources such as MIMIC and ICNARC already 
have their own answers to this, but CCHIC brings several advantages. It is an explicitly 
linkable, multi-centre collaboration with a focus on making the data research ready. This is 
more than the technical challenge of protecting personal information, and effectively 
anonymising data. It is also about creating a culture that promotes collaboration and the 
best quality reproducible science, and we therefore look forward to meeting our future 
collaborators. 
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10 Summary table 
 
 Electronic health record (EHR) research is being led by critical care (for example, 
the MIMIC database at MIT) however all these projects face a common set of 
conflicting challenges: patient privacy, and usability for the researcher 
 CCHIC is a new multi-centre critical care database from the UK that holds data 
from five hospitals, eleven ICUs and more than 20,000 admissions 
 Uniquely CCHIC is an explicitly linkable with patient identifiers retained to allow 
mapping of health from the cradle to the grave 
 CCHIC is provided with a set of research ready open source software tools in order to 
facilitate the final part of the contract with patients in using their data: that we can 
show patient benefit. These tools include: 
o Anonymisation 
o Data cleaning  
o Data extraction in a language agnostic manner 
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12 Appendices 
12.1 Data specification 
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